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ABSTRACT
The Constitutional Conundrum: Commerce and the Tenth Amendment
Jennifer M. Walker
Since the drafting of the United States Constitution, the power of both the federal government
and the individual state governments has been a topic of controversy. The Constitution’s strong
focus on federal powers ultimately threatened to derail ratification. To secure the ratification of
the Constitution, a Bill of Rights was added to the document. Comprised of ten amendments, the
Bill of Rights generally elaborated on individual rights. The Tenth Amendment, however, dealt
more specifically with the federal-state relationship. Several early federal court cases established
the federal judiciary’s power to answer important Constitutional questions. This power thus
granted the federal judiciary the authority to determine the constitutionality of issues concerning
the relationship between states and the federal government. By the early nineteenth century,
concerns of federalism began to involve the interpretation and application of the Commerce
Clause. An examination of federal court cases (most at the Supreme Court level) dealing
specifically with both commerce powers, federalism, and the meaning of the Tenth Amendment
provides valuable insight into the large-scale political climate and attitudes of the United States.
Through a chronological breakdown of these most pertinent court cases, a pattern emerges: the
federal judiciary’s historical stances on the Tenth Amendment-commerce connection tend to
reflect the broader state of America politics and attitudes during the time of their ruling.
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Introduction
“As fields for constitutional battle, these cases may lack dramatic appeal. But that is the
nature of the issue. Political rhetoric aside, “federalism” is not just a slogan that, when
invoked, provides instant answers to hard questions. It is a framework within which
complex relationships between levels of government continually evolve. Clashes occur
not over abstract propositions, but over concrete questions of day-to-day governing.”
- Linda Greenhouse, “The Fall and Rise of the 10th Amendment,” The New York Times1
During the drafting of what would become the United States Constitution, several
important debates took place. One of the most influential and lasting debates centered around
the document’s failure to enumerate specific individual rights, as well as rights for individual
states within the Union. Ratification of the Constitution was secured with the promise of a
forthcoming Bill of Rights – an extension of the Constitution which would cater to the individual
rights debate.2 While each component of the Bill of Rights has had a lasting impact in its own
unique way, the Tenth Amendment is perhaps the most perplexing, yet important, Constitutional
amendment included in the group.
The Tenth Amendment does not stand alone in its importance and influence; other
components of the Constitution outside of its twenty-seven amendments are critical to the
American governmental structure as well. What is most intriguing, though, is when two or more
otherwise independent components of the United States Constitution work together to create a
Constitutional conundrum: a puzzle or mystery that often raises more questions than it answers.
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In exploring an example of a truly captivating Constitutional conundrum, one often finds a
plethora of debate, legislation, and court decisions that deal with the issue, thus making for a
compelling discussion of just how such an issue is dealt with in Constitutional law.
In terms of the Tenth Amendment specifically, this paper will address and analyze the
Constitutional conundrum of the federal government’s commerce powers granted via the
Commerce Clause. I plan to explore the connection (and dichotomy) between the Tenth
Amendment and federal powers to regulate commerce through a historical lens, working through
American Constitutional law history in a chronological fashion. This history will include an
examination of political climate and discourse; legislation; and the federal court cases that best
highlight the Tenth Amendment-commerce relationship. My historical study is aided by several
chronological “breaks” in American Constitutional law, and the paper will be organized
according to these breaks.3
By breaks, I am referring to important turning points in American Constitutional law in
which court decisions significantly alter the interpretation of the Tenth Amendment-commerce
relationship. This shift can either be a reversal of doctrine, an expansion of doctrine, or an
entirely unique interpretation of the Constitutional issues surrounding the relationship. Through
my research and analysis of these key court decisions, legislative actions, and related writings, I
argue that there have been a handful of these key turning points in the view of the Tenth
Amendment-commerce relationship. Furthermore, such key turning points and the federal court
cases they involve are often indicative of the American political climate on a broader scale – not
just in terms of American Constitutional law. In this instance, “political climate” refers to the

3

In reading this paper, one may notice heavy reliance on American Constitutionalism: Structures of Government,
Volume I by Howard Gillman, Mark A. Graber, and Keith E. Whittington. I used this source rather extensively due
to both its relevant historical background information and its inclusion of Supreme Court opinion excerpts for many
of the cases examined hereafter.
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general trend of American politics at the federal level (for example, a turn towards conservatism,
a shift towards progressivism, or something else entirely).
Context and Definition of Key Terms
Structure of the Constitution. Before proceeding with the historical examination of the
Tenth Amendment-commerce relationship, it is crucial to clarify and explain commonly-used
terms and concepts that will be present in the argument. First, the structure and composition of
the United States Constitution must be addressed. Ratified in 1789, the United States
Constitution is composed of an introduction, seven articles, and twenty-seven amendments. The
introduction, or Preamble, is a simple introduction to the Constitution. Articles I, II, and III lay
the foundation for and delegate power to the legislative, executive, and judicial branches,
respectively. Article IV deals with state relationships; Article V instructs how to handle changes
to the document; Article VI states that the Constitution is the “supreme Law of the Land;” and
Article VII pertained to ratification. Following these original articles are the twenty-seven
amendments, the first ten of which were included in the Bill of Rights (an addendum to the
Constitution made soon after ratification).4 With this basic structure in mind, I will further
explain several key clauses and portions of the Constitution that will be discussed at length in
this paper.
The Tenth Amendment. As the Tenth Amendment is one of the featured issues in the
Constitutional conundrum, it is critical to define and explain it in the context of the Tenth
Amendment-commerce Constitutional conundrum. The Tenth Amendment reads, “The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are

4
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reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”5 In short, the function of the Tenth
Amendment could be interpreted to imply that individual states within the United States hold
powers not given to the federal government. However, the same amendment could be
interpreted as a restatement of the obvious.6 In fact, Epstein and Walker write in Constitutional
Law for a Changing America: Institutional Powers and Constraints that,
“…some understood the Tenth Amendment to do little more than to affirm that the
Constitution created a federal government limited to its enumerated power. To some
states’ rights advocates, however, the amendment established the rights of states,
creating a protected area – an enclave – for state power.”7
On its surface, such a statement seems relatively simple and straightforward. However, coupled
with other Constitutional clauses and concepts, the Amendment is incredibly multifaceted.
Police Powers. In more common terms, the Tenth Amendment’s powers granted to states
are referred to as “police powers.” The term’s historical origin was in English common law.
Under the Tenth Amendment’s reserved powers, police powers give the state license, “…to
protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community.”8 There are numerous
examples of such police powers either conflicting or interacting with the federal government’s
delegated commerce powers, and those instances will be thoroughly examined.
The Commerce Clause. As the second main component of this paper’s Constitutional
conundrum, federal commerce powers demand further explanation before proceeding. A
commonly-referenced clause within the Constitution pertains specifically to federal commerce

5
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powers, thus earning it the title of the Commerce Clause. Found in Article I, Section 8, Clauses
1 and 3, the Commerce Clause states, “The Congress shall have Power To…regulate commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes…”9 Taking the
Commerce Clause at face value, one would assume that the federal government holds the power
to regulate interstate commerce, foreign commerce, and commerce with Native American
groups. However, Gillman, Graber, and Whittington argue that the Commerce Clause is the
most contentious Constitutional element.10 This clause is interesting because it is not only
independently controversial, but it is also controversial when grouped with other components of
the Constitution.
Interstate Commerce. Before moving on to the next Constitutional clause, I must define
“interstate commerce,” as it is a recurring theme and term in the Tenth Amendment-commerce
relationship. At a basic level, interstate commerce refers to commerce involving two or more
states. Controversy followed this term from the beginning – early debates centered around
whether interstate commerce referred to strictly commercial materials or commerce more
generally.11 Like the concepts of police powers and federalism, interstate commerce appears
straightforward and logical. However, various federal court cases, pieces of legislation, and
general political thought have demonstrated that interstate commerce is not as one-sided as it
appears. Different eras in American Constitutional history have defined interstate commerce
differently, both in terms of its explicit state involvement and its implicit impacts.
The Necessary and Proper “Elastic” Clause. One additional clause that must be
addressed is the Necessary and Proper Clause, also known as the Elastic Clause. The Elastic

9
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Clause is, essentially, the connection between the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause
that makes their relationship so dichotomous. Interestingly enough, the Elastic Clause is found
in the same section of the Constitution as the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8), but it
includes Clauses 1 and 18. Under the clause, “The Congress shall have Power To…make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any
Department or Officer thereof.”12 This clause delegates a vague and unquantifiable amount of
power to the federal government. There has been much debate over what exactly “necessary and
proper” means, and many cases involving the semantics of the clause pertain to the Tenth
Amendment-commerce Constitutional conundrum.13
Federalism. Related to this classic example of confusion over which powers lie with the
federal government and which are reserved for the states is the concept of federalism.
Federalism, as defined by Louis Fisher and David Gray Adler, “…divides constitutional
authority and political power between the national government and the states.”14 Federal
government typically takes precedence over state governments – Article VI identifies the
Constitution as the “supreme Law of the Land.”15 However, the connection between the two is
dynamic and changing.
With a clear framework for analyzing the Tenth Amendment-commerce relationship in
American Constitutional law, it is time to move into the substantive description and breakdown
of the relevant case decisions that define the connection between these two elements. Through
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my research, I have identified a handful of clear “breaks” in American Constitutional history, at
least in the context of the Tenth Amendment-commerce relationship. The first of these historical
periods is the pre-1824 “Early Years.” The remaining nineteenth century follows next, with
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) denoting the “turning point” from the previous period. Afterwards, the
“Time of Confusion” from the turn of the twentieth century into the 1930s is bookended by the
Progressive Era and the Great Depression. From there, we move into the mid-twentieth century
of the New Deal, Great Society, and beyond. Finally, the “Modern Era” began with the National
League of Cities v. Usery (1976) decision. Each of these eras are distinctive in terms of the case
law relating to the Tenth Amendment-commerce Constitutional conundrum, as well as the
general trend of American politics during the time.
Pre-1824: The Early Years
Political Climate and Examination of Early Cases
There is a common misconception that the duties of the federal judiciary were unclear
following the 1789 ratification of the United States Constitution. Gillman, Graber, and
Whittington, however, argue that this was not the case. In fact, the judiciary was obligated to
rule on the constitutionality of statutes prior to the most infamous of United States Supreme
Court cases, Marbury v. Madison (1803). Defined as, “…the power of the courts to interpret a
constitution and refuse to apply statutes that violate it,” judicial review is a power commonly
attributed to the outcome of Marbury v. Madison.16
In reality, though, the case was largely inconsequential and seemed to serve mainly as a
definitive acknowledgement of the Supreme Court’s judicial review power.17 McConnell’s
writing in “The Story of Marbury v. Madison: Making Defeat Look Like Victory” speaks to this

16
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point. According to McConnell, Chief Justice Marshall advised the federal judiciary
(particularly the Supreme Court) to turn to the political process for solutions to constitutional
questions that were not straightforward or judicially answerable.18 Based on this argument, the
precedent for the connection between the judiciary and politics was set early in Constitutional
history. Further exploration of this connection will demonstrate the increasing role of politics in
judicial decisions.
The decision in Marbury v. Madison, however, was not the only example of precedentsetting in the crucial Early Years of American Constitutional history. A property dispute in
Virginia provided an opportunity for the federal judiciary to clarify its stance on the relationship
between themselves and state courts (Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1816). Essentially, the property
in question was part of Lord Thomas Fairfax’s land in Virginia. The Virginia Court of Appeals
awarded the land to one party in the case, but the Supreme Court awarded the land to the other
party in the case based on the tenets of the 1794 Jay Treaty. The Virginia Court of Appeals did
not implement the decision; rather, the court argued that the provision of the Judiciary Act of
1789 that made such a ruling possible clearly violated states’ rights.19 Was this case an early test
for the relationship between states and the federal government?
While the case itself involved a Virginia property dispute, the outcome at the federal
level implied a broader meaning. The central question debated in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee
concerned the authority of the federal judiciary over state judicial rulings. When the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of federal authority in judicial decisions, the lines of federalism were clearly
drawn. In this action, the Supreme Court appeared to set the precedent that there was both a

18

Michael W. McConnell, “The Story of Marbury v. Madison: Making Defeat Look Like Victory,” in
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clear path and a separation between federal power and state power. However, the Court
qualified that distinction in specifying that federal power took priority over state power.20
As the reaffirmation of both judicial review and federal judicial supremacy would
suggest, the first three-and-a-half decades of American Constitutional history were full of other
examples of both precedent-setting and answering confusing Constitutional questions. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 shaped the initial structure of the federal judiciary, but subsequent
geographical expansion of United States territory led to tacked-on changes to the makeup of the
federal court system. According to a history of the federal court system published by the Federal
Judicial Center, many of these court expansions were piecemeal and lacked uniformity.21 This
haphazard addition of federal judicial branches attested to the need to answer pressing questions
and set precedent during the Early Years.
Along with these concerns over the judiciary came an excess of political issues. Events
such as the War of 1812, the Louisiana Purchase, and the rise of the Jeffersonian faction
demonstrated just how crucial the first years of American Constitutional history were to the
development of a clarified relationship between the Tenth Amendment and federal commerce
powers.22 It is difficult to distill the most important and lasting impacts from each of these
political issues, but these early years of American Constitutional history appear to have one
overarching theme: tradition. The Early Years laid the foundation for more complex and adapted
functions of the federal government, and this was highlighted by the Court’s affirmation of
federal commerce powers in 1824.

20
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1824-1900: Nineteenth Century
Political Climate and Direction
Comprising the largest expanse of time in this Constitutional analysis, the Nineteenth
Century era was one of great change and turmoil (although the same could arguably be said
about every era of American history). However, it was during the nineteenth century that the
Civil War took place, dividing and ravaging the nation. The aftermath of the Civil War, called
Reconstruction, produced three notable Constitutional amendments that shaped several federal
court cases in the late nineteenth century.23 It was also during the nineteenth century that the
federal judiciary began a more substantial examination of the Tenth Amendment-commerce
Constitutional conundrum. Prior to this era (in the Early Years), the constitutional question of
how these specific elements of the document worked together was not addressed by the Court in
a complete and cohesive manner.
This changed in 1824 with the landmark decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, which was
followed by a handful of other cases that worked to further clarify the federal-state relationship
in the context of commerce. In spite of these influential and definitive rulings, a much larger
internal issue served as the focal point of the nineteenth century: the American Civil War. Aside
from the abolition of slavery, the Civil War had lasting impacts on both the federal government’s
power to control states and the general principles of federalism. President Lincoln took on an
unprecedented amount of power during his administration.24 This, coupled with other national
changes, likely influenced the trajectory of the Tenth Amendment-commerce question
throughout the rest of the century.

23
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The Federal Judicial Center’s publication on the federal judiciary’s history draws
attention to the enormous burden of the court system throughout the nineteenth century. In fact,
the later decades of the century were characterized by lively debates over the most effective way
to fix the judicial system.25 Given that the nineteenth century witnessed internal conflict and
overall expansion in the United States, it is not entirely surprising that the court system
commanded attention and debate over its ability to function. Nevertheless, the federal judiciary
made important strides in defining the Tenth Amendment-commerce relationship.
The Beginning: Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)
The first truly noteworthy case concerning state regulatory power and federal power to
control commerce originated from a dispute between the state of New York and the federal
government. In this particular case, the state of New York granted two business owners
complete control over steamboats within its waters. The owners then granted Aaron Ogden the
authority to run steamboats between New York and New Jersey. This in itself was not an
immediate issue until Thomas Gibbons began running different steamboats between the two
states (as authorized by the federal government). With this, the concern of whether state or
federally licensed operators received priority came into play.26
The conflict between Ogden and Gibbons rose an important question regarding the
control of commerce that supposedly occurred in the space of two states. Additionally, the
conflict raised the question of whether the federal licensing requirement took precedence over
the state requirements. In its decision, the Supreme Court determined that the federal law
prevailed over the comparable state regulation, which granted the ability to operate steamboats

25
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between New York and New Jersey to Gibbons (the individual with the federal license).27 To
help make sense of the decision, Chief Justice Marshall explored the definition of the Commerce
Clause in his majority opinion:
“’The subject to be regulated is commerce; and…it becomes necessary to settle the
meaning of the word…Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is
intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of
nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that
intercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between
nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the
admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to
prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals…’”28
Marshall’s assertion is interesting for several reasons. Most importantly, he discussed the idea
that commerce could extend to cover the physical transportation of goods rather than just the
goods themselves.29 As we delve further into the federal courts’ decisions on commerce and
state police powers, we will see a recurring theme of clarifying the definition of “commerce.”
Another important feature of Marshall’s argument was the perspective it offered on the federal
government’s power in relation to state power. Although the Constitution itself articulated
federal supremacy over the states, the Gibbons decision gave weight to the idea in terms of
commerce issues.
Although the constitutional question presented in Gibbons seems relatively
straightforward and logical by today’s standards, its context in the early nineteenth century was
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different. Writer Mark Tushnet drew attention to the early exploration of federal power in terms
of the judicial and legislative branches. His arguments rely on the tenets of the “representationreinforcing review,” which hypothesizes that the federal judiciary exists as a reflection of what
American politics should ultimately produce. In other words, “Representation-reinforcing
review justifies judicial intervention either to eliminate the failures of the political market so that
it would work properly in the future or…to mimic the results that would have occurred had the
political market been operating properly.”30 What does this have to do with the decision in
Gibbons v. Ogden?
The Supreme Court’s decision seemingly abided by the representation-reinforcing
review, as the outcome of the case reaffirmed the validity and supremacy of federal commerce
powers over state commerce control (which had been incorrectly viewed by New York as
superseding federal control).31 Much like the preceding Early Years, the first large decision
regarding the juxtaposition of federal and state powers seemingly focused on setting a precedent
for future issues. The case also highlighted the necessity of defining the federal government’s
role in commerce.
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia (1852)
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gibbons v. Ogden was, in many ways, a precedentsetting move that attempted to clearly define the line between state and federal power in the
context of commerce. Less than thirty years after the landmark court case, however, the midnineteenth-century Supreme Court decided a case that bore some striking similarities to its 1824
predecessor. Taken at face value, the outcome of Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of
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Philadelphia (1852) appeared to contradict the Supreme Court’s previous ruling in Gibbons v.
Ogden. This was not the reality.
The main Constitutional issue in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia
once again centered around laws pertaining to the usage of ships. The state of Pennsylvania
passed a law in 1803 that required the use of local pilots for transmission of certain ships through
Philadelphia’s port. In the context of this law, the Constitutional question dealt with whether
Pennsylvania’s state government had the authority to control commerce in the way specified by
its state law. To further complicate the issue, the federal government had previously passed a
law in 1789 that “grandfathered in” all existing state regulations for pilot use in local waterways.
Since the ships operated by Aaron Cooley (a party in the case) were engaged in interstate
commerce as opposed to intrastate commerce, the case made its way to the Supreme Court for
determination.32 In spite of the superficial similarities between Cooley v. Board of Wardens of
the Port of Philadelphia and Gibbons v. Ogden, the two cases deviated from one another in their
outcomes.
In its decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Board of Wardens of the Port of
Philadelphia for a seemingly logical and definitive reason. Unlike in Gibbons v. Ogden, the case
in question dealt with the proper application of a state law (as opposed to a federal law).
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania law occupied an otherwise uncharted regulatory space – the
federal government had no such law governing the use of pilots in ships’ movement through
different areas.33 Writing the majority opinion for the Supreme Court’s decision, Justice Curtis
argued,

32
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“’The act of 1789 contains a clear and authoritative declaration by the first
Congress…that until Congress should find it necessary to exert its power, it should be left
to the legislation of the States; that it is local and not national; that it is likely to be the
best provided for…by as many [regulations] as the legislative discretion of the several
States should deem applicable to the local peculiarities of the ports within their
limits.’”34
Essentially, the Supreme Court’s decision defined qualifications for federal regulation of
commerce as complex and multidimensional. Justice Curtis’ opinion argued that there was a
regulatory space left open for individual states where federal interstate commerce regulations did
not already exist.35 The Supreme Court clarified the position they took in Gibbons v. Ogden,
where a federal law was specifically in place to regulate commerce in the way debated in the
case. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, on the other hand, arose over a
state law that existed in the absence of a relevant federal law.
An interesting feature of this case is its lack of Tenth Amendment discussion. One
cannot help but wonder why the amendment was not used to argue in favor of the Pennsylvania
law. According to a history of the Tenth Amendment written by William E. Leuchtenburg, its
place in the mid-nineteenth century was largely relegated to a justification of slavery.36 If
Leuchtenburg’s statement is true, then perhaps the parties in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the
Port of Philadelphia elected to stay away from the Tenth Amendment due to its politicallycharged nature. Although the outcome of the case reinforced the idea of the Tenth Amendment’s
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reserved powers, it is possible that neither the Supreme Court nor the parties involved in the case
elected to apply the amendment due to its political connotations.
Political connotations of the Tenth Amendment aside, the logic utilized in Cooley v.
Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia showed the mid-nineteenth century viewpoint of
the Supreme Court regarding federal commerce power. According to Noel T. Dowling’s 1940
article in the Virginia Law Review, the Supreme Court adopted a new explanation for its rulings
on commerce power and state police power in the mid-nineteenth century. Cooley v. Board of
Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia essentially justified the coexistence of the Supreme Court’s
newer interpretation of commerce power and the older interpretation from Gibbons v. Ogden.
Rather than simply award power to the federal government or to the states in the absence of
federal legislation, the Supreme Court forged a new path.37 Dowling argues that the Supreme
Court recognized the need for national control in specific instances as well as the need for local
or state control in some contexts of commerce.38 This theory, however, did not carry into the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century.
A Brief Note: Civil Rights Cases (1883)
In a brief departure from the general narrative of the interaction of commerce and the
Tenth Amendment, I will examine the role of 1883’s Civil Rights Cases in shaping a future
federalism issue. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as part of Reconstruction. The
law explicitly outlawed racially-motivated discrimination in a range of public settings, such as
trains and inns. When the constitutionality of the legislation ignited controversy, the federal
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government justified the legislation’s purpose as one designed to protect public interest in private
spaces.39 This logic, however, did not withstand judicial interpretation.
The outcome of the Civil Rights Cases is important to our present Constitutional
conundrum not for what the Supreme Court interpreted, but for what the Supreme Court did not
interpret. According to Gillman, Graber, and Whittington, the Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in terms of the Reconstruction Amendments (the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments).40 Such an examination resulted in the
adoption of the state action doctrine, which refined anti-discriminatory policies to only apply to
government entities. This allowed racial discrimination to persist in private businesses. By
relying on the Reconstruction Amendments to determine the constitutionality of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, the Supreme Court effectively overlooked the tenets of the Commerce Clause.41
What, then, does this decision have to do with the Tenth Amendment-commerce
relationship and its connection to the broader political climate at the time? Based on the timing,
it is possible that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was likely not evaluated in the context of federal
commerce powers due to the persisting political issues of the Reconstruction period. For
example, the Reconstruction-era Amendments were relatively new additions to the
Constitution.42 Perhaps the Court was preoccupied with defining and quantifying the
amendments, which it did in its Civil Rights Cases decision.
Additionally, the Reconstruction period ended in 1876 with the compromise election of
President Rutherford B. Hayes. It is possible that the end of Reconstruction politics signified a
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similar shift in the Supreme Court.43 In spite of the Supreme Court’s lack of discussion of the
Commerce Clause in the Civil Rights Cases, elements of both the relevant legislation and the
judicial reasoning involved in the outcome played a pivotal role in federal judicial decisions less
than a century later.
Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois (1886)
Like two of previous cases discussed in the Nineteenth Century section, Wabash, St.
Louis and Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois (1886) dealt with state involvement in regulating
transportation. Unlike the previous two cases, however, this particular case highlighted the age
of the railroad as the premier mode of transportation in the United States.44 It also demonstrated
the pervasiveness of Gilded Age politics and economic interests, as railroads were an essential
component of the late nineteenth century’s prosperity.45 The Supreme Court’s decision in
Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois also seemingly reflected the Gilded
Age government’s generally favorable attitude towards business practices, as railroad companies
arguably had considerable influence over national politics at the time.46
As the use of railroads for shipping goods became more commonplace, both intense
competition and monopolistic practices emerged in the industry. Gillman, Graber, and
Whittington wrote specifically about the difference in price politics between long-distance and
short-distance shipments via railroad. Competition on the former drove down prices, but lack of
competition on the latter escalated prices. As costs for short-distance shipping grew, those who
relied on the railroads for shipping their goods called for price regulations. The state of Illinois
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eventually banned price structures that placed those who relied on short-distance shipping at a
disadvantage.47 In theory, this seems like an incredibly necessary and positive piece of
legislation. However, it is also a key exemplification of our Constitutional conundrum at work.
After being found guilty for violating the Illinois legislation, the Wabash, St. Louis and
Pacific Railway Company sought the opinion of the Supreme Court. Their main argument relied
on the tenets of interstate commerce regulation, which the Illinois legislation allegedly violated.48
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the railroad company, and the majority opinion provided a
plethora of reasons for the decision. Justice Miller’s majority opinion directly referenced the
decision in Gibbons v. Ogden. He argued that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Commerce Clause highlighted the value of federal regulatory power over interstate commerce.49
To further justify this distinction in the context of the Wabash decision, Justice Miller argued,
“’It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that the right of continuous transportation from
one end of the country to the other is essential in modern times to that freedom of
commerce from the restraints which the State might choose to impose upon it, that the
commerce clause was intended to secure.’”50
In other words, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court specifically emphasized the
importance of removing any complications from industry and interstate commerce. This left
little space for the smaller entities involved in railroad transportation, and larger companies
experienced continued success throughout the rest of the nineteenth century.51 Railroads were
not the only industry in which such a process occurred.
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United States v. E. C. Knight Company (1895)
As stated previously, the late nineteenth century was a key time for business and
industrial development in the United States. Known as the Gilded Age, this time saw the rise of
monopolistic firms (termed “trusts”) that drew both the attention and the criticism of the public.
The origin of United States v. E. C. Knight Company (1895) demonstrated both the value of
public opinion and the influence of business’ success in the federal judiciary. In this particular
case, the American Sugar Refining Company took control of four other sugar refining companies
(including E. C. Knight Company). This move effectively created a trust in the sugar refining
industry. According to Gillman, Graber, and Whittington, President Grover Cleveland elected to
prosecute the trust for a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) due to “political
pressure.”52 The Supreme Court’s decision, however, reflected the priority position that business
success occupied in Gilded Age politics.
In the application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to the newly-created sugar trust, the
Supreme Court dealt with the issue of the Commerce Clause’s authority over the trust’s space in
the sugar industry. The Supreme Court ruled (in an 8-1 decision) in favor of E. C. Knight
Company, as they determined that the Commerce Clause had insufficient power to “regulate the
production of goods.” Furthermore, the Court determined that the Sherman Antitrust Act was an
invalid vehicle for policing the sugar trust.53 In the majority opinion for this case, Chief Justice
Fuller framed the Constitutional issue in question as a state police power matter rather than a
federal regulatory matter:
“’The relief of the citizens of each State from the burden of monopoly and the evils
resulting from the restraint of trade among such citizens was left with the States to deal
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with, and this court has recognized their possession of that power even to the extent of
holding that an employment or business carried on by private individuals, when it
becomes a matter of such public interest and importance as to create a common charge
or burden upon the citizens… is subject to regulation by state legislative power.’”54
In this opinion, the Supreme Court argued that antitrust movements and legislation should occur
at the state level. Additionally, the opinion differentiated these antitrust activities from
traditional “interstate commerce,” therefore decreeing that, “’The regulation of commerce
applies to the subjects of commerce and not to matters of internal police.’”55
What does this say about the political context of the Gilded Age? Coupled with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois, the
Constitutional conundrum of the Tenth Amendment and commerce in this case seemed highly
subject to the preferences of business rather than to the actual tenets of the Constitution. Both
rulings provided explanations for their outcomes, but one cannot help but wonder why the
Supreme Court asserted federal commerce power in one instance and not the other. According to
an article by Michael Les Benedict, the Gilded Age Supreme Court had strong connections to
both popular opinion and the overall political climate. In fact, popular opinion was so crucial to
the Gilded Age Supreme Court that it often dictated the Court’s decisions.56 Perhaps this is why
both Gilded Age cases discussed in this section ultimately resulted in rulings that favored
businesses and trusts. Such influence, however, was about to enter a transitional period.
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1900-1937: Time of Confusion
Political Climate and Direction
The turn of the twentieth century illustrated a shift away from the throes of nineteenthcentury politics. With Theodore Roosevelt’s election to the Presidency in 1900, the Gilded Age
tapered off and made way for an arguably contradictory period of American judicial history: the
Progressive Era. This is not to say that the change occurred overnight; several events and trends
in the late nineteenth century indicated that a political shift was imminent. For example, the
Populists (led by William Jennings Bryan) made a convincing pass at the Presidency. Gillman,
Graber, and Whittington also note that the Republican Party often advocated for more sweeping
and inclusive national policies on trade during the Gilded Age.57 The latter trend in particular
foreshadowed an overarching conflict during the early twentieth century: regulation of
commerce by either the states or by the federal government.
The Progressive Era, however, took these changes and issues one step further. Over the
course of the Constitution’s history, only twenty-seven amendments have been added to the
original text – and ten of those amendments were included in the original Bill of Rights. Out of
the seventeen other amendments, four were passed in a span of seven years during the
Progressive Era.58 Clearly, the early twentieth century (and the Progressive Era specifically) was
defined by large-scale political and Constitutional changes. Were such progressive changes
reflected in the federal judiciary? The judiciary addressed a handful of cases pertaining to
commerce and state police powers during the early twentieth century, but it is difficult to say that
judicial decisions mirrored the country’s other political spheres at the time. In fact, Dowling
notes that the judiciary prior to 1938 lacked a cohesive approach to questions of commerce
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power.59 There are several possible explanations for these transient and often confusing federal
court decisions.
Perhaps the most logical explanation for the federal court decisions regarding commerce
and the Tenth Amendment is, simply, the meaning of the word “commerce.” During the
Progressive Era, the Supreme Court did not follow the trend of the political climate in their
decisions. Their movements and opinions regarding commerce were often met with severe
disapproval from those who tended to favor federal supremacy.60 However, this criticism
reflected the complex and nuanced nature of the very meaning of “commerce.”
According to Barnett, scholars frequently debated the meaning of “commerce” in the
midst of the New Deal and Great Society era (which followed the Progressive Era and the
economic boom of the 1920s). Most found “commerce” to have a broad meaning, but Barnett
argues that the original use of “commerce” instead had narrower connotations. Furthermore,
Barnett finds that the eighteenth-century definition of the word was distinct from production or
“manufacture.” This was a noteworthy difference from the early- to mid-nineteenth century
political climate and attitude, but it aligned with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
“commerce.”61 Based on these conflicting definitions and ideas, it is easy to see just how the
early twentieth century became a “Time of Confusion.”
When analyzing the various meanings of “commerce,” it is important to acknowledge
that the early twentieth century was not a period of uninterrupted Progressive belief, policy, and
thought. In fact, Fisher and Adler note that the judiciary did not always support the changes
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made in other areas of the federal government. The judiciary, according to their argument,
tended to limit their endorsements of federal regulatory power to commerce pertaining to
specific and narrow areas (including railroads and morality).62 There is perhaps no more
perplexing example of this tendency than the Supreme Court’s stance on child labor and
commerce.
Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)
As previously discussed, the early twentieth century was filled with political and
economic events that created a rocky atmosphere for Constitutional law. A recurring theme of
the Progressive Era in particular was the movement toward more substantial federal regulations,
and child labor was certainly not exempt from such reforms. Congress passed the Keating-Owen
Act in 1916, which effectively banned child labor-produced goods from interstate
commerce. The legislation came under Constitutional question when a father sued for his sons’
right to work in a factory.63 In the resulting case, Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), the federal
judiciary had the opportunity to examine both commerce issues and the Tenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart seemed to indicate the shifting
ideas of the time. The Court declared the Keating-Owen Act unconstitutional on the grounds
that it extended federal regulatory powers outside of commerce and into production.64 In the
Supreme Court’s majority opinion, Justice Day elaborated on this point:
“When offered for shipment, and before transportation begins, the labor of [the goods’]
production is over, and the mere fact that they were intended for interstate commerce
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transportation does not make their production subject to federal control under the
commerce power.”65
Essentially, the Supreme Court determined that this legislation was an unconstitutional extension
of the Commerce Clause in the sense that it impacted more aspects of trade than simply
commerce.
This decision stands out for several reasons. First, the message shared by the Supreme
Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart was somewhat contradictory. According to a piece written in a
1937 edition of the Columbia Law Review, the federal judiciary upheld a federal law that
prohibited the interstate shipment of alcohol due to both the “’exceptional nature of the subject’”
and already-existing ban on alcohol in several states.66 In a modern context, one could make a
convincing argument that child labor is “exceptional” in terms of its subject matter. The article
in the Columbia Law Review seemed to agree; it proposed that a child labor law modeled after
the alcohol law could potentially prove successful when placed under judicial analysis (assuming
that several states had laws prohibiting products made using child labor).67 While such a
comparison of the regulation of alcohol and child labor seems questionable in a modern context,
the Supreme Court’s reasoning was indicative of broader political attitudes at the time.
Aside from the insight into views on morality in the early twentieth century, Hammer v.
Dagenhart highlighted the political context in which it was decided. The Progressive Era may
have played host to many regulatory (and some moral) reforms, but significant emphasis was
still placed on the economic powerhouse that was turn-of-the-century manufacturing in the
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United States. In fact, Epstein and Walker argue that, “…the Court’s willingness to embrace a
free enterprise philosophy reflected the general mood of Americans, some of whom were
benefiting financially from the growth of the economy.”68 Perhaps this favoring of industry
contributed to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart. Just two years later, the
path towards ensuring some form of federal regulatory power over state power (albeit in the
context of wild animals) showed the necessity of safeguarding against broader American
political interests and attitudes.
Missouri v. Holland (1920)
Other cases examined thus far in this Constitutional conundrum have dealt primarily with
Tenth Amendment and commerce issues contained within the United States. Missouri v.
Holland, however, expanded two areas of discussion: federalism structures and states’ abilities to
police certain practices in the context of international treaties. As the conservationist movement
gained momentum in the early twentieth century, there was increasing demand for the federal
government to take action on environmental issues. Congress responded to these demands by
including an amendment to another bill. This amendment created countrywide limitations on the
hunting of birds, effectively nationalizing a regulatory power that had previously been left to the
states.69 This action seemed relatively harmless, but that was not the reality.
Almost immediately, the federal government dealt with backlash from states that thought
the new legislation circumvented their own police powers. To enhance their stance on the issue,
the federal government entered into a treaty with Great Britain regarding the regulation of bird
hunting for species that migrated between Canada and the United States. This was further
supplemented by the passage of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, which applied the
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treaty’s tenets to the individual states. The case made its way to the Supreme Court following
the Missouri Attorney General’s arrest for violating the law. In Missouri v. Holland, the primary
question centered around whether or not the federal law conflicted with “traditional property
rights” that a state possessed over such birds.70
Although the court case primarily dealt with the federal government’s power to enforce
treaties, there were broader underlying issues of state police powers and federalism at play. The
majority opinion of the Supreme Court was careful to distinguish treaty power from the
traditional legislative power of Congress.71 Justice Holmes argued,
“’…Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of
the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of
the United States…We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treatymaking power; but they must be ascertained in a different way.’”72
Aside from the differentiation between traditional Congressional powers and the federal
government’s treaty powers, Justice Holmes’ opinion addressed the interpretation of the
Constitution as an “organism” rather than simply an antiquated document. He believed that the
Constitution was meant to adapt to contemporary needs and contexts rather than remain rooted in
the eighteenth century.73 While the implications of Justice Holmes’ “organism” argument were
not immediately apparent, the debate over such Constitutional interpretation would return to the
forefront of political debate in the late twentieth century.
In terms of what Justice Holmes’ opinion suggested about federalism and state police
powers, Missouri v. Holland seemed to demonstrate the necessity of elaborate policymaking
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strategy to ensure the validity and constitutionality of bird protection. Rather than simply
passing a law that protected migratory birds, the federal government searched for a way to
subvert traditional state police powers through means that would stand up to scrutiny. They did
so through the ratification of an international treaty. Although the outcome of the case favored
the federal government rather that state police powers, the path to the outcome arguably
demonstrated the post-World War I predisposition to favor state police powers over federal
legislation.74
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States (1935)
Once the Great Depression struck the United States, the federal government attempted to
rectify the devastating economic situation in which many Americans found themselves. The
election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the Presidency provided some sense of optimism, as his
New Deal program was specifically focused on ending the Great Depression. There were several
failed attempts at getting New Deal legislation past the federal judiciary, and the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) was no exception. Passed in the early 1930s, NIRA allowed for
industries to standardize their working conditions and then allow those conditions to be enforced
by the federal government.75 While good in theory, the legislation did not please the Supreme
Court.
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation was a chicken-slaughtering establishment that
operated in the New York City area. Their chickens often came from outside New York state,
which made the company subject to their industry’s regulations as decreed by NIRA.76 The
company was charged with violating these regulations, and the case made its way to the Supreme
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Court. In its decision, the Court primarily considered whether the federal government had the
authority to regulate commerce in the context of local businesses (in this case, businesses that
served a locality).77 The outcome of the case was incredibly telling.
Given the time period of the early New Deal era, the Supreme Court predictably struck
down NIRA as an unconstitutional exercise of federal commerce powers. Their reasoning
primarily centered around the fact that the practices of a generally local business (A. L. A.
Schechter Poultry Corporation) did not impact interstate commercial activities.78 This decision
mirrored those of earlier Court cases (most notably United States v. E. C. Knight Company and
Hammer v. Dagenhart) with respect to the perceived unconstitutionality of federal laws
governing commerce.
Where this case was unique, however, was in Justice Brandeis’ closing comments to the
federal attorneys who were arguing the case. According to Gillman, Graber, and Whittington,
Justice Brandeis (a proponent of the Progressive movement) told the attorneys for the United
States, “’This is the end of this business of centralization …As for your young men, you call
them together and tell them to get out of Washington – tell them to go home, back to the states.
That is where they must do their work.’”79 Justice Brandeis’ comment specifically pointed
towards the Supreme Court’s belief that matters of economic recovery were a state issue rather
than a federal one. Such a belief may have suggested that the early New Deal era judiciary did
not necessarily consent to the general direction of federal legislation during the time. However,
this would change just two years later.
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Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936)
While Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936) arguably demonstrates an
instance of cooperation between the Tenth Amendment and commerce, the outcome of the case
stood out as an anomaly in early New Deal-era Constitutional disputes. In this instance, the
federal government exercised its commerce powers in the construction of a dam along the
Tennessee River. From there, a legal battle ensued regarding the federal government’s right to
both construct the dam and harness the energy generated by the dam.80 In addition to the
argument for federal commerce powers in favor of control over the dam, is interesting to
examine the role that the Tenth Amendment played in the outcome of this case.
Until the decision in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, many New Deal policies
and programs were routinely ruled unconstitutional. For example, the decision in A. L. A.
Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States posited that the Commerce Clause did not
constitute a sufficient justification for controlling commerce that largely occurred in one state.81
Perhaps the decision in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority foreshadowed what was to
come in the later years of the New Deal.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Tennessee Valley Authority, thus confirming the
constitutionality of their dam construction and energy collection. In the majority opinion, Justice
Hughes went so far as to connect the decision to the tenets of the Tenth Amendment:
“’…Authority to dispose of property constitutionally acquired by the United States is
expressly granted by section 3 of Article IV of the Constitution…To the extent that the
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power of disposition is thus expressly conferred, it is manifest that the Tenth Amendment
is not applicable.’”82
In other words, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion on the case suggested that the ruling
favored the federal government because there was a clear, tangible connection between the
power exercised and its Constitutional source. Furthermore, the Tenth Amendment did not apply
to the construction and energy production of the dam.83 For this reason, perhaps the decision in
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority was not entirely abnormal. As previously stated, the
early to mid-1930s was a time during which the federal judiciary (particularly the Supreme
Court) broke away from general popular opinion and the surrounding political climate. The
decision in this case followed the pattern of other early New Deal decisions in the sense that the
Supreme Court sought out explicit links between the exercise of federal power and its source.84
In the cases decided against the federal government, the relationship between federal activities
and clearly-defined commerce powers was often less apparent.
Carter v. Carter Coal Company (1936)
Like the other federal court decisions explored in this section, Carter v. Carter Coal
Company (1936) dealt primarily with New Deal-era policies and the relationship of those
policies to federal commerce powers. The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 attempted
to install voluntary regulations on labor and competition within the coal industry.85 Not long
after the passage of the legislation, Carter Coal Company (based in coal-dependent West
Virginia) sued over the new law. According to writings from Supreme Court Justice Sutherland,
the primary Constitutional question in the case concerned the ability of federal commerce powers
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to extend to an activity such as coal mining.86 The general direction of the Supreme Court at the
time of this particular case (1936) meant that the outcome was far from groundbreaking.
In the case of Carter v. Carter Coal Company, the Supreme Court struck down the
legislation that attempted to regulate the coal industry’s labor and competition conditions.87 The
reasoning for this decision bore a striking resemblance to the reasoning put forth in Hammer v.
Dagenhart. Justice Sutherland argued,
“’The employment of men, the fixing of their wages, hours of labor and working
conditions, the bargaining in respect of these things…each and all constitute intercourse
for the purpose of production, not of trade…Mining brings the subject-matter of
commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it.’”88
Like the decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart, this particular decision differentiated between
production and commerce in the context of labor regulations.
How does this line up with other Supreme Court decisions during the 1930s?
Ramaswamy’s writings provide a partial explanation for the rationale behind the decision in
Carter v. Carter Coal Company. According to Ramaswamy’s book, The Commerce Clause in
the Constitution of the United States, the federal commerce power was carefully designed to
avoid overstepping its clearly drawn boundaries. He argued that the presence of the Tenth
Amendment further supported this idea, as it, “…reinforces the conclusion that the powers of the
federal government were carefully circumscribed so as to prevent its encroachment on the
residuary sovereignty of the states.”89 Based on this argument, it seems safe to say that the
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Supreme Court of the early New Deal era interpreted the federal-state relationship (federalism)
as a clearly outlined model with stationary parts. This was about to change.
1937-1976: New Deal, Great Society, and Beyond
Political Climate and Direction
The federal government’s initial efforts to correct the country’s course in the
Depression’s early years often fell short, but the 1932 election of President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt (FDR) provided some promise for change. This change, however, was not
immediately reflected in the Court. FDR’s platform of sweeping economic change and
assistance, termed the New Deal, was wildly popular amongst the American public. The
Supreme Court was less enthusiastic about the New Deal, and they were particularly concerned
with the constitutionality of such intense federal involvement in commerce.90
In fact, the federal judiciary’s initial opposition and subsequent switch to support has
historically posed some challenges for those attempting to analyze American Constitutional law.
Jack M. Balkin writes, “A good test for the plausibility of any theory of constitutional
interpretation is how well it handles the doctrinal transformations of the New Deal period.”
According to his argument, the trajectory of American Constitutional analysis fundamentally
changed during the New Deal era.91 The period following the New Deal and Great Society eras
will further illustrate this point. For now, however, it is important to focus on the nuances of the
mid-twentieth century.
Until this point, the general view of federalism had been precise and hierarchical.
Termed “dual federalism,” the federalism of the pre-New Deal years largely kept state and
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federal issues separate from one another. The federal government was situated firmly above the
state government in terms of power, but the powers of each were clearly defined and rarely
overlapped. The federalism of the New Deal Era, however, was more complex. Termed
“cooperative federalism,” this new formulation championed more overlap and involvement of
the federal government in the doings of individual states. 92
The Court seemed slow to adapt to this change, which led to FDR’s Court Packing Plan
and several years of New Deal legislation being repeatedly struck down.93 Perhaps the Court
Packing Plan served as a wake-up call to the Supreme Court, as their decisions tended to favor
FDR’s New Deal policies relatively soon after the plan’s proposal.94 The Supreme Court’s
response to the Court Packing Plan exhibited a clear case of the political climate affecting the
federal judiciary. Epstein and Walker also allude to this; they argue that the Supreme Court’s
shift in response to New Deal legislation was a direct result of opposition from other branches of
government.95 The late 1930s demonstrated the first significant “break” for New Deal
legislation, beginning with the Supreme Court’s decision in National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (1937). This was one of the first significant instances in which the
Court upheld New Deal legislation, and it was even more significant in the context of this paper
due to its permission of federal commerce regulations. The Supreme Court’s new interpretation
of federal commerce powers would prove crucial to the social change of the 1950s and 1960s.
As the mid-twentieth century progressed, the Supreme Court’s tendency to uphold federal
legislation remained. The 1960s saw the beginning of the New Deal’s younger sibling, Great
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Society. Once again, sweeping federal reforms attempted to change the structure of the
country’s economic processes.96 Coupled with this change was the Civil Rights Movement’s
increasing momentum. The Civil Rights Movement raised its fair share of constitutional
questions regarding state police powers, federal commerce powers, and the tenets of the Tenth
Amendment.97 These questions were not explicitly addressed in the outcomes of landmark Civil
Rights cases, but they were arguably implicit in the complaints of the parties involved in the
cases. This section will deal with a variety of Court decisions and cases. While each may not
specifically address the Tenth Amendment-commerce relationship, they each offer a valuable
piece of the puzzle to help explain the connection.
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937)
For the first several years of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, the Supreme
Court habitually overturned the program’s legislation and invalidated its efforts toward resolving
the Great Depression.98 By 1937, however, things were at a tipping point. The Wagner Act,
passed in 1935, created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). A primary goal of NLRB
was to protect employees within industries that engaged in interstate commerce. This particular
case arose out of a steel company’s attempts to suppress union activity at a plant.99 The case
eventually made its way to the Supreme Court, where its outcome signaled a shift in the federal
judiciary.
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. proved to be a
landmark case in more ways than one. First, the Court’s decision that intervening in a labor

96

Frances Fox Piven, and Richard A. Cloward, “The Politics of the Great Society,” in The Great Society and the
High Tide of Liberalism, ed. Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur (University of Massachusetts Press, 2005),
253, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vk5wz.12.
97
Epstein and Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Institutional Powers and Constraints, 467-8.
98
Gillman, Graber, and Whittington, American Constitutionalism: Structures of Government, 418.
99
Gillman, Graber, and Whittington, American Constitutionalism: Structures of Government, 447.

36
situation fell within the scope of federal powers seemingly redefined the federal judiciary’s view
of federal commerce powers.100 In fact, Chief Justice Hughes specifically stated,
“’When industries organize themselves on a national scale…how can it be maintained
that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may
not enter when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing
consequences of industrial war?’”101
Second, this was one of the first instances in which the Court actually upheld New Deal
legislation, signaling a delayed response to the changing tide of the American political
climate.102 With this decision, the Supreme Court seemed to adapt to the New Deal era. Why,
though, was this shift delayed?
For several years prior to this decision, the Supreme Court tended to run counter to
popular opinion. This trend was not restricted to the New Deal; Gillman, Graber, and
Whittington noted its existence throughout the early twentieth century. Their description of the
federal judiciary (particularly the Supreme Court) during the New Deal provides some insight to
why the Court was so slow to adapt to the political climate. Many Supreme Court justices at the
outset of the New Deal responded poorly to the Progressive Era, and “were likewise skeptical” of
FDR’s reforms. This, however, gradually changed as FDR appointed new Supreme Court
justices during his time in office.103 Arguably, the Supreme Court’s change of heart in National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. demonstrated that Constitutional law
occasionally takes time to adapt to a changing political climate.
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United States v. Darby Lumber Co. (1941)
Continuing on with the general trend of positivity associated with New Deal legislation,
the federal judiciary upheld another key piece of President Roosevelt’s program in the early
1940s. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was previously enacted in 1938 to both improve
and standardize working conditions across the United States. The most important stipulation of
FLSA was minimum wage and overtime pay, which employers “’[engaging] in interstate
commerce, or in the production of goods for that commerce,’” had to pay their workers.104 The
case primarily questioned the federal government’s power to regulate such conditions under the
Tenth Amendment, which was interesting since an earlier case dealing with specific labor
practices and regulations (Hammer v. Dagenhart in 1918) struck down the legislation in
question. However, writer Robert L. Stern (writing in 1939) characterized the Hammer v.
Dagenhart decision as, “…contrary both to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.”
Furthermore, he contended that the Supreme Court’s decision attempted to create principles of
federalism within the Constitution that did not exist.105 Stern’s condemnation of the Hammer v.
Dagenhart outcome seems to suggest two things in the context of the Tenth Amendmentcommerce Constitutional conundrum. First, the decision in 1918 may have been affected by the
power and presence of industry in the early twentieth century.106 Second, the political climate of
the later New Deal years likely called for a strengthening of federal regulatory power.107 The
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Darby Lumber Co. (1941) did not stray from that
popular demand.

104

Epstein and Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Institutional Powers and Constraints, 350.
Robert L. Stern “An Opinion Holding the Act Constitutional,” Law and Contemporary Problems 6, no. 3 (1939):
436-8, doi:10.2307/1189605.
106
See the “Time of Confusion” section of this paper (p. 22) for an in-depth discussion of this matter.
107
See the “Political Climate and Direction” subheading of this section (p. 33) for an in-depth discussion of this
matter.
105

38
In its decision, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act and
stated that it did not violate the Tenth Amendment. Justice Stone wrote, “’The amendment states
but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of
its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national
and state governments…’”108 By stating that the Tenth Amendment was a restatement of a
simple fact rather than an extra protection, the Court demonstrated the changing perception of
federalism in the context of commerce. United States v. Darby Lumber Co. was important in
signaling the position of American political thought and Constitutional law in the New Deal era,
as it showed a continued trend towards upholding federal power; expansion of interstate
commerce’s definition; and a change in the Tenth Amendment’s interpretation.
To illustrate this point, legal theorist and writer M.M.C. insisted on the need for the Fair
Labor Standards Act in 1930s America. He argued that, “As industry has grown in national
dimensions, so has grown labor relations. The federal regulation that is so very essential to the
solution of this nation-wide problem seeks its justification in the commerce clause.” M.M.C.’s
opinion regarding the validity of FLSA may have rested on the Commerce Clause rather than the
Tenth Amendment, but his opinion nevertheless demonstrated the inextricable link between the
two Constitutional elements.109 Furthermore, his advocacy for increased federal regulatory
power at a time when the Supreme Court was beginning to favor such policies may indicate the
general tendency of the Court to gradually mirror popular political opinions. Such an expanded
definition would prove very advantageous during the Civil Rights Movement and the federal
court cases related to civil rights legislation.
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Katzenbach v. McClung (1964)
As stated previously, the expanded definition of interstate commerce in the context of
federal regulatory power took on a new significance in the Civil Rights Movement. Due to the
nature of the movement, a handful of controversial Civil Rights-related cases made it to the
Supreme Court. In Katzenbach v. McClung, a local restaurant in Alabama came under fire for
not serving African-American customers. This violated a provision of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which specifically outlawed segregation on the basis of race in spaces open to the
public.110 Katzenbach v. McClung sparked yet another Tenth Amendment-commerce
controversy, but the explicit questions of the case centered around the government’s commerce
powers rather than the tenets of the Tenth Amendment. In its decision, the Supreme Court
upheld the government’s ability to regulate commerce in such a way that it could interfere in
instances where discrimination “discouraged travel and economic development.”111
While this seemed to be a cut-and-dry case of federal commerce powers, a deeper
examination might raise questions of the Tenth Amendment’s role in such a debate. Legislation
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 undoubtedly reached a point of regulatory control that had
barely been touched by the federal government. The last instance of such control was
Reconstruction, specifically the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. However, the broader
scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (which bore a striking similarity to its 1964 counterpart)
was restricted in the outcome of the Civil Rights Cases (1883). In that instance, the Supreme
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Court held that private actors or entities could not be subject to policies enacted under the
allowance of the Reconstruction-era amendments.112
The shift in the applicability of anti-discrimination legislation from the state alone to all
actors was a key result of the Civil Rights Movement.113 Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s
changing and expanding opinion on the constitutionality of anti-discriminatory policies
demonstrated the nature of shifting judicial interpretations in the context of commerce. As in
United States v. Darby Lumber Co. (which showed the judiciary’s change in stance on the Tenth
Amendment), the decision in Katzenbach v. McClung seemingly reflected the broader political
climate and trend in the United States at the time.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964)
Since the Civil Rights Act in 1964 was so pervasive in terms of its effects on everyday
American life, there were several federal court cases that dealt with the law’s enforcement and
scope. Heard along with Katzenbach v. McClung, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States
(1964) involved a hotel near Atlanta, Georgia that did not allow African-American customers to
stay in its rooms. The owners of the establishment believed that the Civil Rights Act’s
application to their business was a breach of Congress’s federal commerce powers as given in
the Commerce Clause. More specifically, the hotel owners thought that a ban on discrimination
within a private business was an unconstitutional exercise of federal commerce power.114 When
the Supreme Court considered the factors involved in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, the primary Constitutional provision in question was the Commerce Clause. The motel
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owners had originally sued with the allegation that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 violated several
other Constitutional provisions (including the Fifth and Thirteenth Amendments), but the
Supreme Court generally focused on the role of federal commerce powers.115 At the end of
1964, the Supreme Court issued an opinion on the Constitutional question.
According to the majority opinion written by Justice Clark, the general principles from
which the Civil Rights Act of 1964 derived its power had an established historical foundation.
He argued that the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to institutions such as Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. relied on both the outcome of Gibbons v. Ogden and the uptick in interstate
mobility of Americans. Justice Clark’s majority opinion also established that a,
“’…determinative test of the exercise of power by the Congress under the Commerce Clause is
simply whether the activity sought to be regulated is “commerce which concerns more States
than one” and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest.’”116 Essentially, the
Supreme Court determined that the scope of federal commerce power was an evolving entity.
The opinion also fit with the general trend of American politics during the 1960s, as well as the
broader Civil Rights Movement. The Supreme Court’s qualification of an earlier civil rightsrelated case (the Civil Rights Cases of 1883) in the context of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States seemed to demonstrate the federal judiciary’s reconciliation of past rulings with
modern viewpoints.117
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1976-Present: Modern Era
Political Climate and Direction
In the context of United States Constitutional law history, the final significant and
impactful shift in political thought and judicial decisions occurred in the late twentieth century.
National politics took a superficially conservative turn with the election of Ronald Reagan in
1980. Additionally, the appointment of Justice William Rehnquist to the Chief Justice position
of the United States Supreme Court in 1986 signaled a fundamental shift in the trajectory of
Constitutional law.118 This shift did not occur overnight, though – it is best understood with a
preliminary background on the Supreme Court decisions that foreshadowed the change. These
cases are unique in the sense that they worked to define a Constitutional era as “conservative”
when, in fact, the era itself was not so black-and-white.
First and foremost, let us examine the idea of conflicting principles and reality. In his
work entitled, “Revolution or Retreat?” Mark Robert Killenbeck questions the stance of the
Supreme Court regarding federalism and the Tenth Amendment in the Modern Era. He argues
that in spite of the conflicting opinions regarding these Constitutional principles, the Supreme
Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist will one day be recognized for its efforts to spearhead the
federalism issue.119 While important, this is not the only argument that Killenbeck poses to the
reader. He notes the Modern Era Supreme Court’s tendency to allow the political climate to
permeate its activities. For example, he suggests that the outcome of Bush v. Gore (2000) had
less to do with firm Constitutional principles than it did with political outcomes.120 Although
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Bush v. Gore will not be discussed at length in this paper, it serves as a powerful indicator of the
federal judiciary’s susceptibility to emulating the political climate of the United States. A
similar pattern occurs in the Tenth Amendment-commerce relationship.
The new conservative movement of the late twentieth century demonstrated a shift in
national politics, but it was not an entirely smooth transition. Gillman, Graber, and Whittington
point out that the era was rife with confusion over party identity and the power of specific
political coalitions.121 With these new concerns came a unique and perplexing development in
the federal judiciary, a development that I identify as pseudo-conservatism. In this context, I
refer to “pseudo-conservatism” as the superficial conviction of the federal judiciary to pledge
their allegiance to the rights and liberties of both individuals and the states.
Justice Rehnquist’s pledge to this effect was included in his opinion for National League
of Cities v. Usery (1976), which will be discussed in-depth in this section. In that opinion, he
stated, “’Congress may not exercise [the commerce] power so as to force directly upon the states
its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental
functions are to be made.’”122 While Justice Rehnquist articulated this point quite explicitly, the
actions of the Modern Era Supreme Court did not always follow logically from the Justice’s
argument.
In another reference to this phenomenon of pseudo-conservatism, Balkin hints at the
ideological struggle during the Modern Era: many modern Supreme Court justices (such as
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas) experienced difficulty reconciling their personal
“originalist” beliefs with the reality that was mid- to late-twentieth century federal policy. Due

121

Gillman, Graber, and Whittington, American Constitutionalism: Structures of Government, 537-8.
Karl M. Tilleman, “Does the Tenth Amendment Pose Any Judicial Limit on the Commerce Clause after Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority and South Carolina v. Baker?” Brigham Young University Law Review
1989, no. 1 (1989): 232-3, https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1989/iss1/5/.
122

44
to the existence of New Deal-era programs, many “originalists’” strongly-held convictions were
unsustainable. The appointment of more conservative justices to the Supreme Court created a
new Constitutional conundrum: how does one reconcile his or her conservative views with the
modern state of Constitutional interpretation?123 This juxtaposition framed the final definitive
era of American Constitutional history and produced seemingly contradictory Court decisions.
Significant Shift: National League of Cities v. Usery (1976)
As previously stated, the Modern Era has been riddled with contradiction and vague
guidelines for Court rulings. The best and most effective example of this is the case that truly
began the era: National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). According to Gillman, Graber, and
Whittington, the National League of Cities case marked the first time since the 1930s that the
Supreme Court struck down federal legislation using the Tenth Amendment.124 This case began
rather simply with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which also was the key legislation
called into question several decades earlier in United States v. Darby Lumber Co. (1941). What
is interesting, however, is the similarity between the Constitutional questions of the two cases
and how these questions may work together to contribute to our Constitutional conundrum. As
we can recall, the United States Supreme Court upheld FLSA in United States v. Darby Lumber
Co. because the legislation did not violate the Tenth Amendment.125 The question in National
League of Cities v. Usery was very different.
In 1974, FLSA was expanded to include state and municipal employees in its
protection. Unsurprisingly, the changes were met with resistance at the state and local levels.126
As stated previously, the main question in the Supreme Court case dealt with the validity of the
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new changes in the context of the Tenth Amendment. In the decision for National League of
Cities v. Usery, the Court ruled that the provisions allowing for federal control of state and local
government employee pay violated the Tenth Amendment.127 What is most intriguing, however,
is Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion.
Justice Rehnquist directly referenced the Commerce Clause in his opinion: “’Appellants’
essential contention is that the 1974 amendments to the Act, while undoubtedly within the scope
of the Commerce Clause, encounter a similar constitutional barrier because they are to be applied
directly to the States and subdivisions of the States as employers.’”128 Considering our present
Constitutional question about the relationship between the Tenth Amendment and commerce (as
well as how that relationship reflects the contemporary political climate), it seems that the
Supreme Court used both Constitutional components to rule on legislation. However, the
decision in National League of Cities v. Usery demonstrated a significant shift from the decision
in United States v. Darby Lumber Co. The former used the Tenth Amendment to strike down the
relevant legislation’s application yet conceded that it did not violate the Commerce Clause – the
Commerce Clause simply did not allow extension to state and local governments.129 In United
States v. Darby Lumber Co., however, the Court referred to the Tenth Amendment in its decision
to uphold the relevant legislation (which relied on the federal commerce powers to validate its
regulatory purpose).130
This case highlights an interesting dilemma of the Modern Era: the struggle to reconcile
rights of individual state and local governments (and later, individuals themselves) with
established definitions of Constitutional components. While these superficially seem like
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coexisting goals, history has proven that state governments enact policies that may differ from
one another. To speak to this issue, Sotirios A. Barber argues that the more modern
interpretation of both the Tenth Amendment and Congressional power is drastically different
from the earlier understanding of both concepts.131 Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in National
League of Cities v. Usery strengthens Barber’s argument. While Justice Rehnquist recognized
similar decisions from earlier in the century that upheld federal power, he insisted that there were
specific limits on that power – and the new FLSA provisions in question violated them.132 Other
cases throughout the Modern Era speak directly to the difference between past and present
interpretations of the Tenth Amendment. These seemingly contradictory decisions, however,
reflect the contemporary American political climate throughout the rest of the twentieth century
and into the twenty-first century.
Backtracking on Usery: Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985)
Less than ten years after the National League of Cities v. Usery decision, the Supreme
Court took on another case concerning FLSA. In this instance, the San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority argued that National League of Cities v. Usery exempted it from meeting
overtime pay requirements for its employees. On the surface, this seemed like a plausible
assumption on the part of the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (especially given the
1976 National League of Cities v. Usery decision). Despite the similarities between the two
contested applications of FLSA, the Supreme Court reached a different conclusion in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) than it did in National League of Cities v.
Usery.133
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According to the opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the logic laid out in the National
League of Cities v. Usery decision was vague and therefore difficult to uniformly implement.
Justice Blackmun specifically deemed the earlier decision’s logic as, “’…not only unworkable
but…also inconsistent with established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very
federalism principles on which National League of Cities v. Usery purported to rest.’”134
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun’s opinion explicitly stated that the Supreme Court erred in its
interpretation in National League of Cities v. Usery.135
The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
is noteworthy not only for its reversal of the National League of Cities v. Usery decision, but also
for its exploration of the Commerce Clause’s intention. Justice Blackmun argued that the
National League of Cities v. Usery decision constituted a departure from the correct
interpretation of the Commerce Clause in that it did not apply the new FLSA to state and local
entities. Additionally, Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion connected the Commerce Clause’s
purpose to the structure of federalism.136 In spite of these connections, the reconciliation of
National League of Cities v. Usery with the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority seems dubious at best.
Writer Linda Greenhouse published an article in a January 1982 edition of The New York
Times that may shed some light on the connection (or lack thereof) between the Commerce
Clause and modern federalism debates. Greenhouse notes the reemergence of the Tenth
Amendment in contemporary Constitutional discussion, but she also recognizes the challenges
that such a trend poses to maintaining the government’s generally conservative stance during the
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time period. For example, she identifies the Supreme Court’s tendency to justify seemingly antiNational League of Cities v. Usery decisions as instances of overly broad interpretation of the
aforementioned court case. On top of the reversal of the Supreme Court’s trend in the 1970s,
this article expertly highlights the conflict between the federal judiciary’s very conservative
ideals and their less convincingly conservative realities.137 Such a trend was to continue into the
subsequent decades.
Redefining Modern Federalism: Reno v. Condon (2000)
By the turn of the twenty-first century, the federal judiciary became increasingly
conflicted in its handling of cases concerning federalism. The trajectory of Reno v. Condon
through the federal court system exemplifies this conflict and contradiction due to the rulings of
both the Supreme Court and the lower courts. In 1994, the federal government enacted the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act in an effort to curtail the practice of states releasing drivers’
personal information.138 Objecting to this new law, the state of South Carolina sued the federal
government and claimed that the legislation burdened state agencies with a federal regulation.
Both the United States District Court and the United States Circuit Court had previously ruled in
favor of Condon, South Carolina’s Attorney General (who opposed the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act).139 The Supreme Court held a different opinion.
According to the Supreme Court’s majority opinion (written by Chief Justice Rehnquist),
the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, “…does not subject the states to lawsuits nor require them to
pass new laws…It simply ‘regulates the states as owners of databases.’”140 Furthermore, the
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Supreme Court ruled that the legislation was permissible under the federal commerce power as
part of regulating interstate commerce activities.141 An article in the Harvard Law Review
echoes several of these points. Written after the circuit court decision that found the Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act unconstitutional, the article provided justification for the constitutionality
of the law under the presumption that it only affected states that had actively chosen to sell driver
information. This, the article suggested, indicated that the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act did
not actively require states to carry out extra federal regulations or protections.142 The Supreme
Court’s opinion echoed the sentiments expressed in this article, which was published a year
before the Supreme Court decided the case.
This case in particular is fascinating when compared to National League of Cities v.
Usery and other contemporary cases, as it highlights the conflicting and often contradictory
nature of the federal judiciary during the Modern Era. Reno v. Condon was a demonstrably rare
break in a pattern of either upholding state power or rejecting Congressional power in the context
of federalism.143 This pattern of upholding state policies or invalidating federal policies,
however, did not extend very far into the twenty-first century.
Gonzales v. Raich (2005)
Many of the Modern Era federal court cases have attracted their share of controversy and
public dialogue. The issues at hand in Gonzales v. Raich (2005) further reshaped public interest
and personal liberties in relation to the Tenth Amendment and commerce. In 1996, California
partially legalized medicinal marijuana consumption through the Compassionate Use Act. Two
141

Fisher and Adler, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures: Separated Powers and Federalism,
356.
142
“Constitutional Law. Tenth Amendment. Fourth Circuit Holds That Driver's Privacy Protection Act Violates
Tenth Amendment. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998),” Harvard Law Review 112, no. 5 (1999): 11035, doi:10.2307/1342278.
143
Fisher and Adler, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures: Separated Powers and Federalism,
355-7.

50
women used marijuana for the specified medicinal purposes, but a search by the Drug
Enforcement Administration (a federal entity) resulted in the destruction of one of the women’s
marijuana plants. Following this incident, the two women sued in federal court for an exemption
from the scope of the Controlled Substances Act (a federal law). Their argument claimed that
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act in their case would violate multiple components
of the Constitution, including the Commerce Clause.144
In its decision, the Supreme Court determined that the Controlled Substances Act’s
application did not violate the Commerce Clause. Instead, the Court determined that,
“…Congress could criminalize mere possession of marijuana within state lines on the grounds
that this was necessary as part of a successful national regulatory framework.” Essentially, the
Supreme Court interpreted federal commerce powers to encompass activities contained within
one state under the assumption that such a measure was necessary for national uniformity.145
With such a decision, the Modern Era Supreme Court seemed to turn back towards the “New
Deal, Great Society, and Beyond” era’s pattern of upholding national regulatory powers.
However, perhaps one could also view the decision in Gonzales v. Raich as one with specific
political connections.
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion lends some weight to the idea that the Supreme Court
responded to the American political climate. In the opinion, Justice Scalia appears to make a
point in justifying the Controlled Substances Act in light of California’s Compassionate Use
Act’s shaky connection to interstate commerce: “…Congress’s authority to enact all of these
prohibitions of intrastate controlled-substance activities depends only upon whether they are
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appropriate means of achieving the legitimate end of eradicating…substances from interstate
commerce. By this measure, I think the regulation must be sustained.”146 As previously stated,
the result of Gonzales v. Raich may have been reflective of broader political trends during the
first decade of the twenty-first century. According to a Washington Post article from 2015,
public support for the legalization of marijuana was considerably lower around 2005 than it was
in 2015.147 Is it possible that the more conservative stance of the public regarding marijuana
legalization played a role in the outcome of Gonzales v. Raich? Furthermore, did the Supreme
Court attempt to use the Commerce Clause to justify this possible alignment with the political
climate? Answers to these questions may not be apparent, but one thing is for sure: the
Constitutional conundrum of the Tenth Amendment and commerce has a demonstrable history of
debate within both the federal judiciary and within the broader scope of the American political
climate.
Conclusions
By examining the most important and relevant federal court cases based on the Tenth
Amendment-commerce relationship, one gains valuable insight into the prevailing political
climate and discourse of several distinct eras of American history. It would be inaccurate to
argue that these court decisions alone influenced the course of Constitutional history, but it is
certainly fair to posit that the most important decisions acted as a political barometer for the
United States. There were, of course, a handful of times when court decisions contradicted the
popular political thought or climate of the relevant era. However, this examination of Tenth
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Amendment-commerce court decisions generally supports the idea that the federal judiciary
mirrored the rest of American Constitutional politics in this specific relationship.
Although it is difficult to succinctly conclude the history of the Tenth Amendmentcommerce Constitutional conundrum, it can be effectively summarized in one word: reflective.
In this case, “reflective” refers to the tendency of the course of Tenth Amendment-commerce
legislation and federal court cases to parallel the overarching political climate and attitudes
present during each era. For example, the Early Years from 1789 to 1824 framed the debate as
either secondary or untouched.148 This was mirrored in the precedent-setting and settlement of
pressing Constitutional questions during the era.
Not every era, however, exhibited such immediate correspondence between the federal
judiciary and the broader political climate. For example, the federal judiciary of the early
twentieth century was slow to adapt to the Progressive Era and New Deal.149 In spite of the
differences between each time period examined in this paper, there seems to be a pattern of the
federal judiciary’s Tenth Amendment-commerce decisions replicating the larger political context
of its respective era. Does the existence of this pattern mean that the Constitutional conundrum
is solved? Put simply, the answer is: probably not. In all likelihood, the relationship between the
Tenth Amendment and commerce powers will continue to change in correspondence with
broader American political attitudes and situations.
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